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Abstract: Empirical examination of individual-level survey data on national
identity, in general, reveals a significant relationship between religious
affiliation and an individual's international-policy preferences and that this
relationship varies across Protestant denominations. Specifically, we test
attitudes toward import and immigration policies, the role of international
institutions, and unilateral policy actions. The empirical results indicate that
individuals affiliated with conservative Protestant denominations are more
likely to support positions on international issues that can be regarded as
consistent with the anti-globalist right. We also find evidence of a reinforcing
regional effect among conservatives in the south, and differences in the
preferences of Baptist and non-Baptist African Americans.
Keywords: Religion, international policy preferences, survey data, trade
policy, immigration policy

Since Max Weber's (1958) study of the Protestant ethic,
scholars from a wide variety of academic disciplines have debated the
effects of religion on a nation's economic performance. Recently there
has been a rekindling of interest among economists on the role of
religion in shaping individual traits, attitudes toward economic policies,
and the resulting effects on potential economic prosperity. Iannaccone
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(1998, p. 1465), in his survey of the literature on economics and
religion, argues that the study of religion represents “new territory” in
the field of economics, while Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002, p.
2) assert that “the importance of religion in explaining the prosperity
of nations seems to be experiencing a rebirth.” In a similar manner,
Dark (2000), foresaw increasing attention being paid to religion in the
field of global economic relations. In contrast, Philpott (2002, p. 67)
maintains that up until the events of September 11, most politicaleconomy scholars have long assumed that religion is not among the
factors that influence states' actions in the global arena.
It is well documented that religious participation in the United
States greatly exceeds that of other advanced economies.1 Religious
denominations in the United States, as non-state actors, have the will
and assets to initiate and affect political action and, based on their
particular beliefs, have specific preferences on issues such as abortion
and same-sex marriage and lobby actively to shape policies on these
issues. Though less evident on the world stage, religious
denominations and organizations have demonstrated effectiveness in
shaping international policy actions. A recent example is the successful
drive for debt relief of the poorest nations. Naming the effort after the
Jubilee concept of the Old Testament (Leviticus, in which slaves are
freed and landed property is periodically returned to the original
owner) enabled the building of a broad coalition of faiths. This
coalition, in turn, facilitated a highly visible and sustained public
pressure campaign.2
Another trend in religious participation in the United States is
the surge in the membership of conservative Protestant churches and
the decline in membership of more moderate denominations.
According to Coreno (2002), most sociologists and historians believe
that the growth of fundamentalism is a reaction to the consequences
of modernization and the secularization of religious practices. In an
attempt to defend American culture from encroaching secularism,
individuals form small but interconnected denominations and enclave
communities, thereby separating themselves from mainstream
churches and a secular world.
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Over the past few decades the process of globalization has
fostered ever increasing social interaction and socioeconomic change.
Held et al. (1999) claim that many people see the sheer scale of
contemporary social and economic change brought about by
globalization as beyond the capacity of national governments and
individuals to control or resist. According to Little (2003, p. ix), one
view is that the negative consequences of globalization result from a
marginalization of the labor movement and, therefore, a lack of a
counterbalance to the “crueler aspects of corporate capitalism.” One
would suspect, therefore, that individuals affiliated with denominations
whose origins were to defend traditionalism and resist change would
have specific views toward globalization and international issues.
Consider, for example, a representative statement of the United
Methodist Church (2003):
The global community cannot remain passive spectators of the
relentless march of a globalizing economic system which allows
a few unaccountable economic and financial actors to wield
excessive power at the expense of the vast majority of the
world's peoples.
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2002) statement on
international trade maintains that:
Trade liberalization is designed to open markets and increase
general economic welfare by promoting efficiency of production
and hence increasing the availability and reducing the cost of
goods and services. However, trade liberalization, while it may
produce job gains in some areas, can produce job losses and
family and community dislocation in other areas and can also
lead to environmental degradation. There is also a growing
concern that trade rules may unduly benefit investors in some
countries to the detriment of workers and the economies of
poorer countries creating a widening gap between rich and poor.
Coupled with growing international financial instability, trade
has moved from being considered a technical matter to a
political one.
Coalitions of religious adherents in the United States have
demonstrated the ability to influence national elections, as seen in the
last Republican primary (see Reichley, 2002). They also wield
enormous economic power as collective shareholders and thereby the
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ability to shape corporate governance structures and auditing of social
responsibility. The international relations literature continues to
develop models of how collective preferences of societal actors result
in state policy outcomes, and offers much promise in understanding
how growing religious participation and evangelicalism may constrain
international economic policymaking. (See, for example, Bearce, 2003
for a review of the theory and evidence of how societal preferences
affect monetary policy outcomes.) Of equal interest is the question of
how the beliefs of various denominations are translated into social
preferences of their adherents (see, for example, Johnston, 2001). It
is also important, however, to first determine if individuals affiliated
with various denominations have identifiable global-policy preferences,
and if so, what these preferences might be.
Of course there are numerous empirical studies on the link
between religious affiliation and individual attitudes toward social and
economic policies. Nonetheless, the body of empirical evidence
provides mixed results on the link between religious orthodoxy and
economic and political conservatism. These studies, however, focus on
domestic social policies such as domestic income inequality, income
redistribution, and welfare programs. There is also a substantial body
of research on individual attitudes toward international economic
policies, the most recent of which focus on two common theories or
models of international trade policy preferences—the Ricardo-Viner (RV) model and the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. Both theories consider
the effect of increased trade on input factors' returns and provide a
framework to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of opening
trade on their income. (See Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a and 2001b,
for a survey of this literature.)
The different outcomes of these competing models can be
illustrated as follows: If we assume that the United States is relatively
abundant with high-skilled labor, the H-O model predicts that highskilled workers in the U.S. would support free trade while low-skilled
workers would not. According to the R-V model, workers employed in
comparative advantage sectors would support free trade, while those
employed in comparative disadvantage sectors would not. Scheve and
Slaughter (2001a and 2001b) employ individual-level survey data for
the United States to identify if individual skill level or factor type is a
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significant determinant of trade-policy preferences. The authors find
that factor type rather than sector of employment influences trade
policy preferences. Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003) directly extend
the analysis of Scheve and Slaughter to ten advanced economies.
Using both education and relative earnings as alternative measure of
individual skill level, they find that skill is a robust determinant of
individual preferences on immigration policies. In two additional and
broader cross-country working papers, Mayda and Rodrik (2001) apply
ordered estimation techniques to explain attitudes toward trade and
immigration and find support for the factor endowment model.
What is yet to be given systematic study, however, is the link
between religious affiliation and attitudes toward global policies. Gay
(1991) is one of the few exceptions to this, and yet his assessment of
the evangelical debate over capitalism is based on statements by
“intellectuals” and admittedly not rank and file members. Focusing on
statements of organizational leaders has led some scholars to dismiss
the possibility of a link between religious affiliation and attitudes on
international policies. This position rules out the possibility that the
main commodities of religious denominations, religious beliefs, affect
individual attitudes and in turn manifest themselves in international
policy preferences that are not necessarily consistent with the views of
an organization's Bishops or leading intellectuals. In contrast, we
follow the most recent literature which focuses less on the causal
relationship between religion and economic attitudes and on the
transformative potential of religion. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2002) provide a survey of this theoretical literature on the causal link
and conclude that religious beliefs are low frequency variables—based
on religious teachings and conditioned by the cultural environment of
the religion—that affect adherents' attitudes toward the economic
system and do not necessarily reflect literal messages found in sacred
texts or in statements by religious leaders.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between
religious affiliation and individual preferences toward specific
international policies. Implicitly we follow the approach of Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales toward the relationship between religion and
economic attitudes. Also, we are similar to Milner's (1988) approach to
understanding protectionist attitudes: We do not account for
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international policy outcomes, and we do not contend that we have
fully explained individual international-policy preferences. Rather, we
argue that the impact of an individual's religious affiliation plays an
important and understudied role in shaping individual internationalpolicy preferences. Specifically, our hypotheses are: (1) There is a
significant relationship between an individual's religious affiliation and
their international-policy preferences. (2) Because the United States is
a multi-denominational society, the relationship between affiliation and
policy preferences varies across denominations. (3) Conservative
Protestants, especially those in the southern region of the United
States, maintain a stronger commitment to separatism (as argued by
Coreno, p. 338) and, therefore, are more likely to display anti-globalist
policy preferences.
To explore these hypotheses, we examine International Social
Survey Program (ISSP) data on national identity and augment it with
the General Social Survey (GSS) data to obtain the individual
respondent's religious affiliation. Our four empirical models employ
survey questions on imports, immigration, the role of international
institutions, and unilateral policy actions. Our results, in general, show
that religious affiliation is indeed a significant determinant of
international policy preferences and that individuals affiliated with
conservative Protestant denominations are more likely to support
positions on international issues that can be regarded as consistent
with the nationalist-protectionist right. That is, they are more likely to
agree with polices that restrict imports and reduce immigration, more
likely to oppose granting enforcement rights to international
institutions, and more likely to agree with unilateral policy actions. We
also find, however, that individuals affiliated with the United Methodist
Church—the third largest religious organization in the United States
and one typically considered liberal to moderate in its theological
orthodoxy—also are more likely to support policies that restrict
imports. In addition, we find evidence of a reinforcing regional effect
and differences between African American Baptists and non-Baptist
African Americans on the issues of imports, and granting enforcement
rights to international institutions. In total we take this as evidence of
a relationship between an individual's religious affiliation and their
preferences toward international policies, suggesting that religious-
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based social teaching may indeed affect individual views on global
economic issues.
In the next section we summarize the literature on religious
participation and economic and political attitudes. In that section we
also outline the literature on the conservative to liberal continuum of
Protestant denominations. Next we describe the survey data used in
our empirical analysis. The following section provides the results of the
analysis and a conclusion is then offered.

The Link Between Religious Affiliation And
Economic And Political Attitudes
In an extensive survey, Iannaccone (1998) separates studies of
economics and religion into three categories. The first line of research
deals with the micro-foundations of religious participation, the second
addresses the economic consequences or outcomes of religious
participation, while the third line of research invokes religious
teachings to critique economic policies. This study is in keeping with
the second area of research and, for space considerations, the reader
is otherwise referred to Iannaccone. This section briefly outlines some
of the important contributions on the link between religious
participation, theological orthodoxy and economic conservatism, and
individual attitudes toward international economic policies.

A. Religious Participation and Economic Outcomes
There are a number of prominent empirical studies of the
consequences of religious affiliation. Lowry (1998), for example,
considers religious participation and the individual's choice of
membership in environmental groups. The premise is that religious
affiliation is a measure of an individual's beliefs about “the good
society” and is therefore reflected in the specific policies the affiliation
espouses. Lowery also argues that the strength of an individual's
religious affiliation may, in turn, affect the degree of their policy
convictions. Testing state-level data, he finds that the number of
members of Judeo-Christian denominations per household has a
negative and significant effect on membership rates to groups
advocating public policies in favor of environmental preservation.
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Further, his results suggest that religious affiliation positively affects
membership to sportsmen groups advocating private stewardship of
natural resources.
Glaeser and Glendon (1998) test Max Weber's view that—
because of the Calvinism dogma of predestination versus Catholicism
dogma of free will—economic growth of Protestant nations exceeds
that of Catholic nations. They find that, on average, Protestant
religious beliefs are conducive to higher per capita income and growth
after controlling for individual characteristics such as health status,
age, gender, education, income, and perceived social status, as well as
country fixed effects. Barro and McCleary (2003) find that economic
growth responds positively to enhanced religious beliefs, but
negatively to increased participation, even while controlling for
possible reverse causation. In a similar manner, Mehanna (2003) finds
that countries whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more
open, in terms of trade, than Catholic or Muslim nations.
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002) examine the impact of
religion on attitudes toward several issues including trust of
government, women working, and thriftiness. They find that religious
beliefs are associated with “good” economic attitudes and that
religious effects differ across major religious denominations. Dahl and
Ransom (1999) consider the importance of the strength of religious
affiliation—or religiosity—in the presence of economic self-interest by
surveying members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
on tithing beliefs. Their premise is that devout members, defined by
church attendance, are less likely to allow financial self-interest to
affect their definition of income for tithing purposes. While they find a
pattern that more frequent churchgoers appear less self-serving than
infrequent churchgoers, their likelihood ratio statistics are insignificant.

B. Theological Orthodoxy and Economic Conservatism
There are numerous empirical studies on the link between
religious conservatism and economic and political conservatism. As
discussed and summarized by Pyle (1993), groups such as the Moral
Majority reinforce a public perception that Christian conservatism is
tied to conservative political and economic attitudes. The assumption
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is that, on the one hand, individuals affiliated with conservative
denominations are opposed to progressive government expenditure
programs designed to reduce social inequality. On the other hand,
individuals affiliated with liberal denominations are more accepting of
such programs.
A common hypothesis underlying this opinion is that
conservatives tend to believe that social change should come about
through the conversion of the individual as opposed to reform of
economic and social policies. Pyle concludes that there is little
consensus on the issue, yet argues that social class, race, and political
ideology take precedent over religious orientation, but once controlling
for these factors, religious affiliation still matters and theological
conservatism is likely related to conservative attitudes toward
government assistance programs. His analysis, however, finds the
opposite in that theological liberalism is less likely to predict support
government restructuring programs. His results are not unique as a
number of other studies (see Iannaccone, 1993 for example) which
found that adherents of conservative denominations are more likely to
support government support policies.
Specific to this study, there is the additional difficulty of
associating international policy preferences with liberal or conservative
political ideologies. As argued by Giddens (1994), the left–right
political ideology distinction may not retain any meaning when applied
to anything outside of conventional political issues, such as
globalization. Even so, Steger (2001) argues that there remain
significant differences between the anti-globalists on the left and right
to differentiate between the two, branding the conservative antiglobalist camp as the nationalist-protectionists
Coreno (2002) argues that in order to defend radical
traditionalism against the penetration of secular values; conservative
Protestants often form small, interconnected—yet independent—
enclave communities. By forming enclave communities they are able
to separate themselves, as much as possible, from the encroachment
of secular change. Barro and McCleary also theorize that religion may
influence the propensity to interact with outsiders in domestic or
international business and, therefore, affect a country's degree of
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openness. Hence, we hypothesize that conservative Protestants are
more likely to display nationalist-protectionist attitudes such as
favoring policies that restrict imports and immigration, supporting
unilateral policy actions, and opposing rights being granted to
international organizations.

Survey Data
In order to examine the relationship between affiliation and
international-policy issues, we employ the results of a survey
conducted and compiled by Zentralarchiv für Empirische
Sozialforschung as part of the International Social Survey Program.
The survey is titled ISSP: National Identity and available through the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).3
We augment this data with the General Social Survey (GSS)
component which divides the main Protestant religions into twentyeight sub-denominations. In this section we describe the dependent
and independent variables used in the analysis and the treatment of
missing observations.

A. Missing Data
Our first difficulty lies in addressing the problem of missing
values, a common problem in empirical treatments of survey data.
(The number of missing values for the data used here can be found in
Tables 1 and 2.) There are basically two approaches to handling
missingness. The first approach is to omit the cases with missing
values via listwise deletion. Listwise deletion, however, may result in
biased estimates if the deleted cases systematically differ from the
observed cases, and also reduces the efficiency of estimates because
important information is lost.
The most common alternative to listwise deletion is to impute
values for missing data. This approach does not assume that the
missing data is missing at random as does listwise deletion, rather it
generates correct uncertainty estimates conditional on the data used
to impute missing values. To generate data sets with imputed values
for missing data we use the EMis algorithm of Amelia: A Program for
Missing Data, by Honaker et al. (2000). The reader is referred to King
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et al. (2001) for a detailed description of the advantages of this
approach and the EMis algorithm.
The process of imputing values involves three steps. The first
step is to generate multiple data sets containing imputed values for
missing data. Based on the size of our data set and following King et
al. (2001), we generate five data sets that are used for all applications
in this study. The second step is to estimate a regression model for all
of the imputed data sets, thereby creating multiple coefficient
estimates. The final step is to combine the estimated coefficients and
standard errors.

B. Description of the Dependent Variables
Responses for the following survey items are the dependent variables
of our analysis. The survey items are:
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The
United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to
protect its national economy.
2. How much do you agree with the following: For certain problems like
environment pollution, international bodies (e.g., the United Nations,
European Union, World Health Organization) should have the right to
enforce solutions.
3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The
United States should follow its own interest, even if this leads to
conflicts with other nations.
4. Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays
should be …

For the first three items individuals could select agree strongly,
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly, or
refuse to choose. For the final item, individuals could select increased
a lot, increased a little, remain the same, reduced a little, reduced a
lot, or refuse to choose. Table 1 provides the summary data on the
dependent variables. It is important to note that using policy-oriented
questions implicitly assumes that the respondent has some
understanding of the effects of these policy changes on their individual
welfare.
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C. Description of the Independent Variables
Following the literature cited in this study, we control for a
number of factors that may shape an individual's views on
international policies. In general, we control for demographics,
individual skill level, and political ideology, while testing the
significance of religious affiliation and religiosity. Each variable is
described below.

Demographic, Political Ideology, and Skill Level
Female is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity
for female and zero for male, and Age is a continuous variable,
measured in years. The studies discussed above find evidence, though
not consistently significant, indicating that women are more likely to
support restrictions on trade. In addition, Kull (1998) reports that
women are more likely to support international engagement that is
based on partnership and cooperation as opposed to unilateral action
policy actions. The evidence on age is mixed.
African American is a dichotomous variable that takes the value
of unity if the respondent is African American, and zero otherwise.
Hispanic is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if the
respondent is Hispanic, and zero otherwise. Though previous studies
show that race is an important determinant of support for domestic
social policies, Kull (1998) concludes that race plays a limited role in
shaping views on international policies. Union indicates if the
respondent and / or their spouse is a member of a trade union with a
value of unity, and zero otherwise. Major trade unions in the United
States have very specific views on negative consequences of
international trade and, therefore, union members are more likely to
be opposed to international trade. At the same time, the major trade
unions are favorable on legal immigration and so we do not expect
union members to oppose immigration.
Social Class is the respondent's view of their social status and is
a categorical variable that ranges from 1 for lower class to 5 for upper
class. We expect that individuals that identify with lower social classes
are more likely to feel threatened by globalization, specifically trade
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and immigration. Similar to the studies cited earlier, we model political
ideology with a categorical variable that ranges from unity, indicating
someone who views their political ideology as far left, to five,
indicating someone views their political ideology as far right.
Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) show that, once controlling for
political ideology and demographic characteristics, either education or
earnings are appropriate measures of labor market skills and should
be included as an economic factor as opposed to a demographic factor.
Education and earnings, however, should not be included in the same
model. Because of space consideration and the number of missing
values that were imputed for earnings (423 for earnings versus 4 for
education), we use education as a proxy measure of individual skill
throughout this paper. Nonetheless, in general our results are the
same for either education or earnings and for including both variables
at the same time. Hence, our measure of skill level is a continuous
variable that indicates the number of years of schooling the
respondent has completed. The demographic, political ideology, and
skill variables are summarized in Table 2.

Religious Affiliation
The survey asked individuals if they belonged to a major
religious group. There were approximately thirty denominations that
respondents could identify with including Catholic, Jewish, various
Protestant denominations, other Christian denominations, and nonChristian denominations. Individuals were also allowed to select no
affiliation or to refuse to answer. Only two individuals refused to
answer and were removed from the sample. (In other words, we did
not impute missing values for affiliation.) Individuals with no religious
affiliation serve as the base group for all of our regression analysis.
There were no responses to categories other than Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian and Jewish. The distribution of the sample among the
major denominations is illustrated in Figure 1. In the United States the
ISSP is administered as part of the GSS. The GSS section of the ISSP
further breaks down the major Protestant denominations into an
additional twenty-eight sub-denominations, such as Southern Baptist,
United Methodist, and so on.
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The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) sorts these subdenominations into a topology of liberal, moderate, or conservative,
based upon scales of orthodoxy, biblical inerrancy, and denominational
differences on being born again.4 We shall refer to this particular
classification system as NORC in our regression analysis. Roof and
McKinney (1987) provide an alternative classification system (see
Coreno and Pyle, op. cit., as examples of the application of this
system), which we shall refer to as RM throughout. The two main
differences between RM and NORC are: RM focuses on regional
differences, so that Baptists are divided into those who live in the
south (Census definition) and those who do not, while NORC focuses
on sub-denominations, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention is separated
from the American Baptist Association and so on. Secondly, by
focusing on denominations, NORC divides the sub-denominations of a
major denomination across the liberal to conservative continuum. Roof
and McKinney, in contrast, use a regional approach to divide adherents
into a continuum of sub-denominations. We augment the NORC
system by isolating the second and third largest denominations in the
United States, Southern Baptist and United Methodist respectively, and
augment the RM system by separating Methodists in the same regional
manner as Baptists.

Results
Our objective is to determine if an individual's religious
affiliation holds any additional insight into their international-policy
preferences. Our approach, therefore, is to add religious affiliation and
religiosity to the models of international-policy preferences found most
recently in the literature, thereby controlling for other important
individual demographic, economic, and political characteristics.
In our empirical analysis the possible responses to the survey
questions are modeled as ordered choice models with five possible
answers as detailed in Table 1. Given that the multiple categories of
responses to the survey questions follow a natural order, we employ
ordered probit (OP) estimation techniques. The five imputed data sets
were used to generate the OP estimates for every model. Following
Honaker et al., (2000), model coefficients are the mean estimates of
the five imputed data sets. The standard errors are found by averaging
the mean standard error across the five data sets, combining this
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value with the standard error across the five data sets, which is
adjusted for the fact that the number of observations is less than
infinity. We, therefore, not only allow for uncertainty of the point
estimates, but also for the uncertainty of the imputed values.

A. Base Model Results
Table 3 provides the results of a base model to facilitate
comparisons with the literature cited above. The results indicate that
older respondents, union members, individuals that identify with lower
social classes, and African Americans are more likely to support
policies that restrict imports, while higher-skill individuals and
Hispanics are more likely to disagree. Older individuals and individuals
who identify their political ideology to the right are more likely to
disagree with international institutions having enforcement rights.
Females and higher-skill individuals are more likely to disagree with a
nation acting unilaterally. Older respondents, individuals who identify
their political ideology to the right, and individuals who identify with
lower social classes are more likely to prefer restricting immigration,
while higher-skill individuals and Hispanics are more likely to favor
increasing immigration levels.5

B. Religious Affiliation
Table 3 also provides results for each model when the major
religious denominations and a religiosity measure are added. These
results show that Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, and
individuals affiliated with denominations that fall into the broad
category of “other Protestant” are more likely to support policies that
restrict imports. Lutherans and other Protestants are more likely to
disagree with international institutions having enforcement rights,
while Jews and Baptists are more likely to agree with a nation acting
unilaterally. None of the major denominations are significant in the
regression on immigration.
In addition to the results described above, the results for African
Americans (in regard to imports) appear to be sensitive to the
inclusion of religion controls. We suspect that this reflects the
possibility that religious affiliations have a differential effect within
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race. Subsequent regressions attempt to flesh this out through the use
of cohort groups for African Americans. The results for age also show
some sensitivity to the additional variables (see the imports and
institutions models in particular), specifically because of the greater
religiosity of older respondents.6 Inglehart (1990) suggests that the
difference in religiosity across age may be due to a cultural shift. We
were unable, however, to identify a specific point in time when this
shift might have occurred, consistent with Inglehart's claim (p. 4) that
such shifts are gradual.7 This finding is also consistent with the
empirical evidence showing that religiosity increases with age even
when controlling for time periods and cohort effects (Hout and
Greeley, 1987, p. 328, as cited in Iannaccone, p. 1474).

C. Sub-Denominations Liberal to Conservatism
Classifications
The lack of uniformity in the results across denominations
reveals the importance of disaggregating the major denominations and
the failure to do so is likely the reason that related studies that
aggregate denominations do not find religion to be important.8 In
order to better understand how religious affiliation relates to
international-policy preferences, we classify denominations based on
the NORC and RM classification schemes.
Table 4 provides the results for the NORC system. In addition,
cohorts groups are created for African Americans who are Baptists (55
percent of African Americans in our sample are Baptist) and for African
Americans who are not Baptist. The Hispanic variable is robust to the
inclusion of religious affiliation controls so, given the small number of
observations, we do not create cohort groups for Hispanics. The results
in Table 4 indicate a differential effect among African Americans in that
African-American Baptists are more likely to support restrictions on
trade and non-Baptist African Americans are more likely to oppose
international institutions having enforcement rights. The results in
Table 4 also show that liberal Protestants, conservative Protestants,
and “other” Protestants are more likely to support policies that restrict
trade, and conservative Protestants, and “other” Protestants are more
likely disagree with international institutions having enforcement
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rights. Conservative Protestants are also more likely to agree with a
nation acting unilaterally.
The largest religious denominations in the United States (and in
our sample) are Catholic, Southern Baptist, and United Methodist,
respectively. Under the NORC system, United Methodists are
categorized as liberal and Southern Baptists as conservative (whether
or not the individual resides in the south). To determine if United
Methodist is driving the liberal Protestant results and Southern Baptist
the conservative Protestant results, we separate these denominations
from their respective categories and retest each model. The results
show clearly that the United Methodist denomination is driving the
results on the trade: It is United Methodists that are more likely to
support restrictions on trade, while the remaining liberal Protestant
denominations are not statistically different from the base group.
Southern Baptists, in contrast, are not driving the results for imports,
but display differential effects relative to conservative Protestants
across the other three models in that other conservative Protestants
are more likely to disagree with granting enforcement rights to
international institutions but Southern Baptists are not, while Southern
Baptists are more likely to agree with unilateral policy actions and
restricting levels of immigration.
As an alternative to the NORC classification system, Table 5
provides results for the RM classification system. One significant
difference between the NORC and RM systems is that RM focuses on a
regional dimension and allows us to test our third hypothesis.
Specifically, Baptists are separated into two groups, Baptists,
regardless of whether they are Southern Baptists, who reside in the
South Region and all other Baptists. The reason for this separation is
due to the strong fundamentalist and evangelical dominance of the
region (Coreno, 2002). Another difference between the two systems is
that the RM categories of Liberal and Moderate are based on the major
denominations as opposed to sub-denominations. Hence, all
Presbyterians are categorized as liberal and all Methodists and
Lutherans are categorized as moderate even though when considering
scales of orthodoxy and biblical inerrancy, some sub-denominations
within both are considered conservative Protestants and others liberal.
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Results for the RM system differ from the NORC system in that
moderate Protestants are significant in the imports model whereas
liberal Protestants are not, and conservative Protestants are not
significant in the institutions model. Disaggregating the major
denominations or separating out Southern Baptists and United
Methodists would simply lead us to the results found with the NORC
system in Table 4, resolving the differences just mentioned.9 Instead,
the second set of regressions in Table 5 increases the regional
dimension of the analysis by separating Methodists and other
Protestants in non-south and south cohort groups as a proxy means of
capturing conservative Protestants influences that dominate the south
region.
The results show that Methodists are driving the results for
moderates on the trade question but standard hypothesis tests
indicate that there is no statistical difference between non-south and
south Methodists. In contrast there is evidence of a statistically
significant difference between south Methodists and non-south
Methodists, with the former more likely to favor policies reducing
immigration. Differences also exist between non-south Baptists and
south Baptists, with the latter more likely to favor restrictions on
imports and unilateral policy actions. The remaining regional aspects
are the difference between non-south and south, other Protestants
with the former more likely to oppose the rights of international
institutions and the latter more likely to support policies that restrict
imports, and the difference between remaining moderate Protestants
(after Methodists and non-south Baptists are removed) and Methodists
and non‐south Baptists, as the remaining moderate Protestants are
more likely to support the role of international institutions. Hence, the
results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate evidence of both affiliation and
regional effects. If the regional dimension does indeed proxy for a
conservative dominance in the south, then again, in general, this
supports the notion that conservative Protestant denominations,
particularly those in the south, are more likely to display policy
preferences that can be labeled as nationalistic-protectionist.
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C. Simulations
The magnitude of coefficients of ordered choice models are
notoriously difficult to interpret. To better understand the relative
impact of religious affiliation, we simulate the marginal effects of
religious affiliation for the second set of regressions of the NORC
classification system in Table 4 (along the lines suggested in King et
al., 2000). To do so, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted using
Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results
(Tomz et al., 2001). The process involves drawing 1,000 simulated
parameters from an asymptotic sampling distribution that is
multivariate normal, and whose mean is equal to the vector of
parameter estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance
matrix of estimates. Next the simulated parameters are used to
calculate two sets of probabilities. First, all explanatory variables are
set at their mean value, except for the religious affiliation variables
that are set at zero. In other words, every individual in all five imputed
data sets is treated as if they have no religious affiliation. From this we
generate the predicted probability of response to each category of the
survey question. Next, we change every individual's affiliation to, say,
United Methodist, and repeat the simulation generating new predicted
probabilities. The differences in these predicted probabilities—the
marginal effects—are illustrated in Figures 2 3 4 through 5.10 To better
illustrate the relative importance of religious affiliation, we also include
education (for models 1, 2, and 4) and political ideology (for model 3)
as benchmarks. With respect to education we set all variables to their
mean value and all affiliation variables to zero (a mean-value
nonbeliever). We then increase education by one standard deviation,
from approximately 13 years to 16 years of education, and simulate
the new probabilities. The same process is used for political ideology,
moving the individual from approximately 2.9, or “center,” to 3.9, or
“right.”
Figure 2 shows the change in probabilities for the question on
restricting imports to the United States. The shift from left to right that
occurs moving up the vertical axis illustrates how an affiliation with a
particular group increases the probability that an individual will agree
with policies that restrict imports. The figure shows that the magnitude
of effect is largest for African American Baptists (whereas non-Baptist
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African American was not statistically different from the base group) as
the probability that an individual agrees strongly that the U.S. should
restrict imports increases by more than 15 percent and the probability
they strongly disagree falls by more than 2 percent. The next largest
shifts occur for Southern Baptists and United Methodists, respectively.
For most response categories, affiliation effects are larger than three
additional years of education.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of religious affiliation on
preferences toward the enforcement rights of international institutions.
Again there is a differential effect among African Americans. NonBaptists African American, labeled “other,” increases the probability
that an individual will disagree strongly that international institutions
should have enforcement rights by nearly 3 percent and reduces the
probability that they will agree strongly by more than 10 percent.
Other Protestant and Conservative Protestant are only slightly smaller
in magnitude. These particular affiliation effects are greater than a
shift in political ideology from centre to right.
Figure 4 displays the effects of Southern Baptist and Jewish on
preferences toward unilateral policy actions. As the figure shows,
Southern Baptist has a slightly stronger effect than Jewish, increasing
the probability by more than 9 percent that an individual will strongly
agree, whereas Jewish increases the probability by more than 8
percent. Both effects are relatively larger than the effect of three
additional years of education.
Figure 5 shows the impact of Southern Baptist on immigration
preferences, in which Southern Baptist decreases the probability that
an individual prefers increasing immigration a lot by nearly 2 percent
and increases the probability that they prefer that immigration be
reduced a lot by more than 14 percent. The affiliation effect is larger
across all response categories than three additional years of education.

Conclusion
Rising church membership rates and the resurgence of
evangelical Christianity have proved religion to be an important
cultural force in the United States. In turn, there has been a renewal
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of interest among political economists on the connection between
religion and economic outcomes. In this paper we investigate the
linkage between religious affiliation and individual international-policy
preferences. Our results provide evidence of such a relationship in that
conservative Protestants, particularly those in the south, are more
likely to display anti-globalist views. That is, they are more likely to
agree with polices that restrict imports, and reduce immigration, more
likely to oppose granting enforcement rights to international
institutions, and more likely to agree with unilateral policy actions. We
also find differential affects of religious affiliation among African
Americans as African American Baptists are more likely to support
restrictions on imports than non-Baptist African Americans and the
latter is more likely to oppose granting enforcement rights to
international institutions than the former.
Based on our results, we conclude that religion does matter and
that the impact is far from uniform. It is our hope that this paper will
motivate greater interest in the relationship between religion and
international policy. We suggest that, when the 2003 ISSP survey is
completed and compiled, future studies should extend both across
time to detect possible shifts in cultural norms and cross-country
differences. In addition, future research should also focus on the
mechanism through which religious beliefs and religious participation
affect international-policy preferences (perhaps along the lines posited
by Montgomery, 1996) as well as the process by which these
preferences move toward policy outcomes (such as Bearce, 2003).
This paper benefited greatly from the comments of Marc von der Ruhr,
Jim McGibany, Larry Iannaccone, Rob Toutkoushian, and two
anonymous referees.

Notes
1

2

For data on religious organization and participation, see the American
Religion Data Archive at Pennsylvania State University,
www.thearda.com
According to John Carr, chief legislative strategist for the Catholic Bishops'
Conference, the debt relief program would not have materialized
without the leadership of the religious community (Reichley, 2002).
The efforts of Jubilee 2000 were most visible during the Denver G7
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and Birmingham G8 summits, culminating in the Cologne initiative in
1999.
3
Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP.
Neither the original collectors nor the ZENTRALARCHIV bear any
responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented here.
4
See Smith (1990) for a description of the process and the predictive power
of these classifications.
5
Scheve and Slaughter (2002a and 2003b) do not find region controls to be
significant in regressions on import restrictions nor controls for
“gateway communities” to be significant in regressions on immigration
levels. Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003) deal with the collinearity of
religious denominations and regional controls. They find that regional
controls tend to capture the effects of a region's dominant religion and
become insignificant when this is accounted for. Because the
introduction of sub-denominations introduces this regional aspect, we
avoid the direct use of regional controls in all of the models.
6
The correlation coefficient between the two variables was approximately 20
percent, which is statistically significant at less than the 1 percent
level.
7
We created different cohorts and tested each model three times with the
various cohort dummies. The cohort groups are those born before
1957 and after, before 1962 and after, and before 1967 and after.
Regardless of how we modeled the break in age, none of the cohort
dummies were statistically significant.
8
Alesina and Ferrara (2002), for example, do not find religion to be a
significant determinant of individual trust in others. Disaggregating of
Protestant denominations may prove to be an interesting direction for
that line of research.
9
For example, separating out the Presbyterian denominations classified as
conservative under the NORC system would render the category of
liberal Protestants insignificant.
10
The actual predicted probabilities, the standard errors, and 90 percent
confidence intervals are available upon request.
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Appendix
Table 1. Summary Data for Dependent Variables from Imputed Data
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Table 2. Summary Description of Demographic, Economic, Ideology,
and Religiosity Variables (mean of imputed data and use of the mean)
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Table 3. Base Model/Major Denominations (p-values in
parentheses.)
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Table 4. NORC Classification System / Augmented NORC
Classification System (p-values in parentheses.)
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Table 5. RM Classification System / Augmented RM
Classification System (p-values in parentheses.)
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Figure 1. Distribution among Major Denominations.

Figure 2. U. S. Should Restrict Imports.

International Interactions, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2005): pg. 273-301. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

35

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Figure 3. Institution Rights.

Figure 4. Unilateral Actions.

International Interactions, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2005): pg. 273-301. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

36

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Figure 5. Increase Immigration.
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